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Abstract:  I  argue  that  proper  assertion  requires  belief.  Jennifer 
Lackey has recently argued otherwise. Here I respond to Lackey’s 
argument and provide positive evidence that permissible assertion 
does require belief. The positive evidence takes the form of an ex-
planatory argument from linguistic patterns surrounding the give 
and take of assertion. Looming large in the background of the dis-
cussion is whether there is an even more fundamental normative 
link between assertion and knowledge. Breaking the link between 
assertion and belief would threaten the normative link between as-
sertion  and  knowledge.  My  ultimate  motivation  in  resisting 
Lackey’s  argument is to  preserve  the link between assertion and 
knowledge. 
Increasingly popular nowadays is the knowledge account of asser-
tion (‘the knowledge account’ for short), which in its simplest form 
says that you may assert P only if you know P.1 Some have objected 
* This is  the penultimate version of a paper to appear in Epistemic norms:  
new essays on action, belief  and assertion (OUP).  Please cite the final, 
published version if possible.
1 The knowledge account has been defended extensively elsewhere, e.g. Un-
ger 1975, Williamson 2000,  DeRose 2002, Hawthorne 2004,  Turri 2010, 
and Turri  2011a Turri  2012a;  see also  Turri  2010b,  Turri  2011b,  2012b, 
Turri forthcoming. It is beside the point to rehearse the formidable case for 
the knowledge account here.
1
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that the simple knowledge account is too weak because it allows as-
sertions that are intuitively impermissible and fails to fully capture 
the normative relationship between knowledge and assertion (e.g. 
Turri 2011a). But a more popular objection is that the knowledge 
account is too strong because it disallows assertions that are intuit-
ively  permissible  (e.g.  Douven  2006,  Hill  and  Schechter  2007, 
Kvanvig 2009, McKinnon 2012).2
Jennifer Lackey is one of the foremost critics who argues that 
the  knowledge  account  is  too  strong.  Her  distinctive  argument 
against the knowledge account features cases of what she calls self-
less assertion (Lackey 2007). I’ll mainly focus on her most plausible 
case, which is:
(DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR) Sebastian is an extremely well-re-
spected pediatrician and researcher who has done extensive 
work studying childhood vaccines. He recognizes and appre-
ciates that all the scientific evidence shows that there is abso-
lutely  no  connection  between  vaccines  and  autism.  But 
shortly after his apparently normal 18-month-old daughter 
received one of her vaccines, she became increasingly with-
drawn  and  was  soon  diagnosed  with  autism.  Sebastian  is 
aware that signs of autism typically emerge around this age, 
regardless of whether a child received any vaccines. But the 
grief and exhaustion brought on by his daughter’s recent dia-
2 For a strategy — different from the one defended below — to harmless ab-
sorb such intuitions if they are readily or widely shared, see Turri under re-
view a.  For an  experimental refutation  that such intuitions are readily or 
widely shared, see Turri under review b. 
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gnosis cause him to abandon his previously deeply-held be-
liefs regarding vaccines. Today, while performing a well-baby 
checkup on one of his patients, the child’s parents ask him 
about the legitimacy of the rumors surrounding vaccines and 
autism. Recognizing both that the current doubt he has to-
wards  vaccines  was  probably  brought  about  through  the 
emotional  trauma of  dealing with his  daughter’s  condition 
and that he has an obligation to his patients to present what 
is most likely to be true, Sebastian replies, “There is no con-
nection between vaccines and autism.” In spite of this, at the 
time of this assertion, it would not be correct to say that Se-
bastian himself believes or knows this proposition. (Lackey 
2007: 598–599, with minor alterations)
Here is how I understand Lackey’s argument in light of this case. 
Where  ‘Q’  names  the  proposition  that  there  is  no  connection 
between vaccines and autism:
1. Knowing Q requires believing Q. (Premise)
2. So if Sebastian doesn’t believe Q, then Sebastian doesn’t know 
Q. (From 1)
3. Sebastian doesn’t believe Q. (Premise)
4. So Sebastian doesn’t know Q. (From 2 and 3)
5. If the knowledge account is true, then Sebastian may not assert 
Q. (From 4)
6. But Sebastian may assert Q. (Premise)
7. So the knowledge account isn’t true. (From 5 and 6)
I have three independent responses to this argument.
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My first response is a dilemma: either line 3 is false or line 1 is 
false. As Lackey describes the case, in responding to the patient’s 
parents, Sebastian aims to “present what is most likely to be true.” 
If  Sebastian  thinks  it’s  most  likely  that  there  is  no  connection 
between  vaccination  and  autism,  then  he  mostly  believes  that 
there’s no connection. Plausibly this is enough for him to satisfy the 
belief condition on knowledge; that is, line 3 is false. But suppose 
that Lackey objects that partly or even mostly believing doesn’t suf-
fice for believing. In that case, proponents of the knowledge account 
could plausibly maintain that full-fledged belief isn’t required for 
knowledge; that is, line 1 is false.  Mostly believing or  thinking it’s  
most likely to be true is enough to satisfy the relevant requirement 
for knowledge. This doesn’t seem to be too costly a move, especially 
since Lackey herself seems to have some sympathy for it. She says, 
“if  belief is  not a necessary condition for knowledge,  then some-
thing belief-like surely is” (Lackey 2007: 622 n.18).  Mostly believ-
ing or thinking it’s true is certainly “belief-like.”3
But suppose that my first response fails: grant that Sebastian 
doesn’t believe and consequently doesn’t know that Q. This brings 
me to my second response, which is that line 5 is false.
When Sebastian utters ‘There’s no connection between vaccines 
3 Experimentalists have recently argued that belief is not a necessary condi-
tion on knowledge, as evidenced by the fact that when asked about many 
simple cases, most people answer that the protagonist knows P but doesn’t 
believe P (Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel forthcoming, Murray et al. forth-
coming). For a response to Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel, see Rose and 
Schaffer forthcoming; for a response to Murray et al. and a demonstration 
that a certain sort of belief (“thin belief”) is necessary for knowledge, see 
Buckwalter, Rose and Turri, under review.
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and autism’, some people, such as Lackey, report that they intuit 
that this assertion is permissible. Others, such as myself, intuit the 
assertion is not permissible. In order to sort through this dispute, I 
want to begin by focusing on a slightly different question, namely, 
whose assertion? I grant that this is a rather unexpected question. 
But upon reflection I think it gets some traction, as I will now ex-
plain.
Often times people speak on behalf of a group, community, or-
ganization, institution or other corporate body. When one person 
speaks on behalf of another, call it a vicarious assertion. And when 
the other is a group, let’s call it  corporate or communal assertion. 
When, in his capacity as a practicing and licensed pediatrician and 
in order to meet his professional “obligation[s] to his patients,” Se-
bastian  says, “There  is  no  connection  between  vaccines  and 
autism,” he asserts on behalf of the medical community that there 
is no connection. This is one main way that the medical community 
has to convey such information to patients, namely, by having its 
trained and certified members tell patients such things in clinical 
settings.
Lackey gives two other examples of selfless assertion, and it’s 
instructive that they display similar features. One example, CRE-
ATIONIST TEACHER (Lackey 2007: 599), features Stella, a com-
mitted creationist and 4th-grade teacher who rejects evolutionary 
theory  but  nevertheless  says  to  her  students,  “modern  humans 
evolved from more primitive hominids.” Stella says this because she 
“regards her duty as a teacher to include presenting material that is 
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best supported by the available evidence,” Lackey tells us. Another 
example, RACIST JUROR (Lackey 2007: 598), features Martin, a 
committed racist who served on a jury that acquitted a minority de-
fendant on an assault  charge.  Out on the street one day,  Martin 
bumps into an old friend who asks him about the trial because Mar-
tin was on the jury. Martin says, “The guy didn’t do it,” even though 
Martin still feels (and felt all along) that the defendant was guilty. 
In line with our treatment of Sebastian’s case, Stella is also plaus-
ibly speaking on behalf of a community, namely, the community of 
science educators, which does indeed know that modern humans 
evolved from more primitive hominids. Likewise Martin speaks as a 
member of  the  jury,  which does  know that  the  defendant  is  not 
guilty. It’s certainly noteworthy that all Lackey’s cases of selfless as-
sertion involve a protagonist speaking on a matter related to some 
official duty incurred in some official capacity: physician, instructor 
or juror.
So where does this leave us? Re-focusing for simplicity on DIS-
TRAUGHT  DOCTOR,  we  can  grant  a  great  deal  about  the  case 
without causing trouble for the knowledge account. We can grant 
that Sebastian permissibly asserts Q, even though he doesn’t know 
that Q, because it’s a communal assertion on behalf of a group that 
does know Q, namely, the medical community.4
As confirmation of this way of handling these cases, consider 
how we’d feel about the protagonist’s assertion in the three cases if 
4 Perhaps the medical community doesn’t know that there is  absolutely no 
connection. But they know something close enough, so we can set aside 
such worries.
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they prefaced their remarks with something to the effect of ‘Well, 
speaking just for myself here’. That qualifier acts as a kind of shield, 
preventing  the  protagonist  from speaking  for  the  group.  For  in-
stance suppose that Stella had instead said, “Well, speaking just for 
myself here: modern humans evolved from more primitive homin-
ids,” or that Martin had said, “Speaking just for me, personally: the 
guy didn’t do it,” or that Sebastian had said, “Speaking strictly for 
myself now: there’s no connection between vaccines and autism.” 
With this addition, it becomes much harder to maintain, as Lackey 
would have it, that the assertion is appropriate. It strikes me clearly 
as inappropriate.
The approach I’m suggesting has the further advantage of being 
able to  explain the clash of intuitions about cases like Sebastian’s. 
Sebastian asserts on behalf of the medical community by asserting 
for himself.  It is,  in effect,  a  double-assertion:  one assertion, the 
communal assertion, is made  by making the other, the individual 
assertion.  I  submit  that  the  intuition of  permissibility  tracks  the 
communal assertion, whereas the opposing intuition tracks the in-
dividual assertion.  Since the community knows but the individual 
doesn’t, this all coheres perfectly with the view that permissible as-
sertion requires knowledge and belief.
Given that communal assertion clearly can and often does oc-
cur, and given that we can handle the cases of selfless assertion in 
the way just described without making any controversial assump-
tions,  the burden now shifts back to Lackey to explain why such 
cases nevertheless provide good evidence against a belief condition, 
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and thereby a knowledge condition, on permissible assertion.
But suppose that neither of my first two responses succeeds, be-
cause knowledge requires full-fledged belief, and Sebastian doesn’t 
believe Q, and Sebastian isn’t making a vicarious or communal as-
sertion on behalf of a group who does know Q. Lackey’s argument is 
still threatened because line 6 is doubtful. In support of this, con-
sider the following five data points surrounding the give and take of 
assertion.
First, when I assert P, even if P has  nothing to do with me or 
what I know, asking me ‘Why do you believe that?’ is appropriate. 
The view that permissible assertion requires belief nicely explains 
this. By asserting P, I represent myself as having the authority to do 
so, which authority requires believing P, rendering your question 
appropriate.
Second, an appropriate challenge to any assertion is ‘Why do 
you believe that?’. More aggressive yet is the response ‘Do you really 
believe that?’. And more aggressive yet is the response ‘You don’t 
really believe that!’ or ‘You don’t even believe what you’re saying!’. 
The view that permissible assertion requires belief handily explains 
this spectrum of aggressiveness. ‘Why do you believe that?’ impli-
citly challenges my authority to make the assertion; ‘Do you really 
believe that?’  explicitly challenges it;  and ‘You don’t  even believe 
that!’ explicitly rejects it.
Third,  when someone asks you whether  P,  even when P has 
nothing to do with you or what you believe, normally you may ap-
propriately respond by saying ‘I have no opinion on the matter’ or ‘I 
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don’t have a view on that’ or ‘I have no idea’. The view that permiss-
ible assertion requires belief explains this.  In such a case,  you’re 
simply informing this person that you lack authority to answer her 
question.
Fourth,  assertions  of  the  form  ‘P  but  I  don’t  believe  that  P’ 
strike us as inconsistent (Moore 1942). Their  content is perfectly 
consistent, so whence the inconsistency? The view that permissible 
assertion  requires  belief  explains  it.  If  permissible  assertion  re-
quires believing, then you may make that assertion only if you be-
lieve each conjunct: P on the one hand, and I don’t believe P on the 
other. So your believing the first conjunct would falsify the second 
conjunct. But in asserting the conjunction you represent yourself as 
believing it (because you represent yourself as having permission to 
do so). So what you assert is inconsistent with how you represent 
yourself.
Fifth, it’s all too common to hear things like ‘I can tell you that 
your paper is still out with the referee’. Now consider how odd it 
would sound to say ‘I don’t believe that your paper is still with the 
referee, but I can tell you that it is’ or ‘I have no opinion on whether 
your paper is still with the referee, but I can tell you that it is’.5 The 
view that permissible assertion requires belief nimbly explains the 
oddity of such assertions. The second conjunct states that I have au-
thority to assert that your paper is still out with the referee. But the 
first conjunct either directly denies or obviously entails that I lack 
5 We get the same effect if we replace ‘I can tell you’ in these utterances with 
‘(what) I can say (is)’.
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the authority.
The  hypothesis  that  permissible  assertion  requires  belief  en-
ables a unified explanation of all these data. This speaks strongly in 
favor of the hypothesis. Absent a comparably good alternative ex-
planation, we should accept the hypothesis and reject line 6 of the 
argument.6
A related but more direct objection to line 6 asks us to consider 
how Sebastian’s patient’s parents might react if they suspected that 
Sebastian didn’t believe that vaccines and autism were unconnec-
ted. “Do you really believe that?” they might ask accusingly. How 
feeble  and evasive  it  would seem for  Sebastian to  respond,  “I’m 
sorry, but I don’t see how it’s relevant what I believe or don’t be-
lieve.” And if Sebastian instead sincerely and directly replied, “No, I 
don’t believe it, actually,” such a provocative response would very 
likely be interpreted as a muddled retraction of his earlier assertion 
that vaccines and autism are unconnected. Absent a commitment to 
the view that permissible assertion requires belief, it’s hard to make 
sense of our natural reaction to these permutations of the case.
That ends my defense of the belief norm of assertion. In sum-
mary, I offered three independent objections to Lackey’s argument, 
and in the process provided positive evidence for the belief norm, 
which took the  form of  an explanatory  argument from linguistic 
patterns. I conclude that the belief norm emerges unscathed, and 
6 Recall that at this point in the discussion I’m granting for the sake of argu-
ment that my earlier responses failed, and thus that Sebastian doesn’t be-
lieve Q. In the present context, objecting to my third response by saying, 
“But wait, Sebastian does believe Q,” amounts to agreeing that my first re-
sponse to Lackey’s argument succeeds.
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consequently that this challenge to the knowledge account of asser-
tion does not succeed.7
7 For helpful conversation and feedback, I thank Matt Benton, Keith DeRose, 
Jonathan Kvanvig,  Jennifer  Lackey,  Clayton Littlejohn,  Ian  MacDonald, 
Aidan McGlynn, Rhys McKinnon, and Angelo Turri. Thanks also to audi-
ences at Ryerson University and the University of Waterloo. This research 
was  kindly  supported  by  the  Social  Sciences  and  Humanities  Research 
Council of Canada, the British Academy, the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and an Ontario 
Early Researcher Award.
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